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I. Introduction
In preparation for the 2012 Olympic Games in London ( 
“Games”), the British government took drastic measures to preempt 
the perceived threat of ambush marketing, which the International 
Olympic Committee (“IOC”) persistently alleged was a major 
concern for its official sponsors in the past.  The government has 
criminalized nearly all unauthorized commercial marketing activities 
during the Games, such as skywriting, the use of fliers, posters, 
billboards, and any other advertising activity within specifically 
designated “event zones” around Olympic venues.1  These zones 
* This article was awarded third-place in the 2011 International Association for the
Advancement of Teaching and Research in Intellectual Property (ATRIP) Essay Contest. 
J.D., Whittier Law School; M.A., University of Akron; B.A., Capital University.
Brian Pelanda can be reached at bpelanda@gmail.com. 
1. London Olympic Games and Paralympic Games Act, 2006, c. 12, §§ 19–24 (Eng.);
The London Olympic Games and Paralympic Games Advertising and Trading 
Regulations, 2011, c. 2898, §§ 5–11 (Eng.); See Jacquelin Magnay, Games Ban on Ambush 
Marketing:  London 2012 Government Plans to Stop Companies Cashing in on London 
Olympics and to Improve Security at Venues, DAILY TEL., Mar. 8, 2011, at 13. 
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encompass all surrounding public roads, sidewalks, railway stations, 
and even private property, as well as the airspace above.2  Anyone 
who violates these prohibitions faces penalties of up to £20,000.3  
These anti-ambush marketing restrictions even threaten criminal 
sanctions against fans at Olympic events who so much as don 
promotional garb from unaffiliated companies, such as the group of 
female fans at the 2010 World Cup whom officials ejected from the 
stands for wearing orange dresses that advertised a Dutch brewery 
company.4  Where has this category of strict prohibitions on speech 
evolved from, and is the blanket silencing of all unauthorized 
commercial speech during sponsored athletic events good policy? 
In the marketing context, the Olympics have become nearly 
synonymous with the practice of “ambush marketing,” an advertising 
strategy that the International Olympic Committee and its sponsors 
have complained about for nearly thirty years.  One of the 
particularly notable examples of the practice occurred in 1984 when, 
after Fujifilm secured the exclusive official sponsorship rights to that 
year’s Olympic Games, rival Kodak cleverly secured sponsorship 
both of the ABC telecast of those Games and of the U.S.A. track and 
field team.5  Along similar lines, while McDonald’s was an official 
sponsor of the 1994 Winter Olympic Games, rival fast food company 
and non-sponsor Wendy’s aired television commercials during the 
broadcast of those Games with its recognizable spokesman and 
founder, Dave Thomas, participating in traditional winter Olympic 
sports.6  Commentators and critics have dubbed Kodak’s ad campaign 
during the 1984 Games and the Wendy’s ads during the 1994 
Games—as well as a host of similar commercial marketing strategies 
employed during other high profile athletic events—as “ambush 
marketing.”7  Yet those who have persistently complained about 
2. The London Olympic Games and Paralympic Games Advertising and Trading
Regulations, 2011, c. 2898, §§ 5–6 (Eng.). 
3. London Olympic Games and Paralympic Games Act, 2006, c. 12, § 21(3) (Eng.).
4. Magnay, supra note 1; Emine Saner, G2:  Gotcha!:  A Guerrilla Marketing
Campaign at the World Cup This Week Ended Up With the Perpetrators Being Arrested, 
GUARDIAN, June 17, 2010, at 4; Tariq Panja and Maud van Gaal, FIFA Detains Dress-
Clad ‘Fans’ Marketing Brew-haha, TORONTO STAR, June 16, 2010, at B4. 
5. Dean Crow & Janet Hoek, Ambush Marketing: A Critical Review and Some
Practical Advice, 14 MKTG. BULLETIN 1 (2003). 
6. Patrick Donahue Sheridan, An Olympic Solution to Ambush Marketing:  How the
London Olympics Show the Way to More Effective Trademark Law, 17 SPORTS L. J. 27, 28 
(2010); Bob Garfield, Olympian Dave Thomas?  Now That’s Tough Sledding, ADVERT. 
AGE 52 (Feb. 7, 1994); Michael Hiestand, Ambushers Cut Into Sponsors’ Ground, USA 
TODAY, June 16, 1993, at 9C. 
7. Crow, supra note 5, at 2; Sheridan, supra note 6, at 28.
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ambush marketing over the past few decades have wielded the term 
far too liberally, and thus a great deal of confusion exists between the 
generally accepted definition of ambush marketing and the reality of 
the circumstances surrounding the numerous advertising strategies 
that the term is commonly used to describe. 
The literature on ambush marketing typically defines the practice 
as “a company’s attempt to capitalize on the goodwill, reputation, and 
popularity of a particular event by creating an association without the 
authorization or consent of the necessary parties.”8  On its face, this 
definition describes the practice of false association, which is 
explicitly prohibited in the United States under the Lanham Act, and 
for which a substantial body of case law exists.  Yet, despite the 
innumerable cited instances of alleged ambush marketing over the 
last thirty years, “there is almost no ambush marketing case law in the 
United States.”9  Clearly, there must be a disconnect between the all-
too-frequent allegations of “ambush marketing” as defined above, 
and the reality surrounding the marketing strategies that are often 
alleged to be “ambushes.” 
This article discusses who controls the discourse on “ambush 
marketing” and why the discourse is flawed, the marketing strategies 
commonly alleged to be “ambushes,” and the applicability of 
American law to the subject.  Although some have considered it to be 
too lenient,10  American trademark and unfair competition law 
adequately balances the competing interests at stake in alleged 
8. Stephen McKelvey, Atlanta 96: Olympic Countdown to Ambush Armageddon?, 4
SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 397, 401 (1994); Jason K. Schmitz, Ambush Marketing: The Off-
Field Competition at the Olympic Games, 3 NW. J. OF TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 203, 205 
(2005); Noelle K. Nish, How Far Have We Come?  A Look at the Olympic and Amateur 
Sports Act of 1998, The United States Olympic Committee, and the Winter Olympic Games 
of 2002, 13 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 53, 65 (2003); Sheridan, supra note 6, at 28 (ambush 
marketing is a practice whereby companies attempt to make the consumer think their 
product or service is somehow affiliated with a popular sporting event or league); Jennifer 
Donatuti, Can China Protect the Olympics, or Should the Olympics Be Protected from 
China?, 15 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 203, 209 (2007) (“Ambush marketing occurs each time a 
non-Olympic sponsor portrays itself as an official Olympic sponsor in an effort to 
‘capitalize on the goodwill, reputation, and popularity’ of the Olympics.”);  See also USOC 
v. AMI, 156 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1203 (D. Colo. 2001) (the USOC characterized AMI’s
magazine as ambush marketing, i.e., an attempt to suggest association with the “Olympic
Movement”); MATTHEW BENDER, THE LAW OF ADVERT. § 10.07.01 (2010).
9. Sheridan, supra note 6, at 29.  “[I]n the last twenty years . . . few ambush
marketing cases have gone to trial.”  Id. at 33. 
10.  Id. at 29; Jamie Bischoff, Jeffery P. Curry & Ingrida Berzins, Dispatch from the
Trademark Wars: Ambush Marketing and the Arena of Sports, METRO. CORP. COUNCIL, 
Feb. 2005, at 19 (referring to the U.S. legal framework under the Lanham Act as a 
comparatively “tolerant legal regime”). 
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ambush marketing cases and should serve as a model for the rest of 
the world to follow. 
II. The “Ambush Marketing” Discourse
Event sponsors, corporate stakeholders, and commentators have 
discussed the issue of so-called “ambush marketing”—which is most 
often alleged to occur during high profile international athletic events 
such as the Olympics—primarily under the premise that the practice 
transgresses ethical boundaries, regardless of whether governments 
legally permit or prohibit certain forms of it.11  The International 
Olympic Committee and many others have applied the term to a 
myriad of different corporate advertising strategies employed during 
such events, all of which to varying degrees purportedly interfere with 
or dilute “official” corporate sponsorships.  The pervasive liberal use 
of the term “ambush marketing” is problematic because it cloaks an 
overly broad range of marketing practices with a presumed shroud of 
negativity and illegality.  Generalizing all commercial speech that 
seeks to capitalize on the occurrence of high-profile athletic events 
without authorization from event organizers as “ambush marketing” 
suggests a definitive conclusion about the legality and/or the ethicality 
of the practice.  The pertinent question thus concerns the scope of 
practices that should be confined to the label of “ambush marketing,” 
and whether sufficient legal protections currently exist in the United 
States to contain it. 
The power to define ambush marketing and the categories of 
activities it encompasses is important because it includes the ability to 
influence the formation of law.  For example, the IOC requires 
national organizing committees of potential host countries to secure 
protection of the Olympic marks and to enact special—event 
legislation designed to curtail ambush marketing.12  Several countries 
such as South Africa, China, and England have responded to the issue 
by legislating severe criminal penalties for a host of commercial 
11. See Michael Payne, Ambush Marketing: The Undeserved Advantage, 15
PSYCHOLOGY & MKTG. 323 (1998); John A. Tripodi & Max Sutherland, Ambush 
Marketing—An Olympic Event, 7 J. OF BRAND MGMT. 412, 414 (2000); Sheridan, supra 
note 6, at 48 (“Beyond purely monetary concerns, though, there is the basic unfairness of 
ambush marketing . . .”). 
12. See Olympic Charter, www.olympic.org/documents/olympic_charter_en.pdf (July
8, 2011); Host City Contract: Games of the XXX Olympiad in 2012, www.games 
monitor.org.uk/files/HostCityContract.pdf (July 6, 2005); Doris Estelle Long, Trademarks 
and the Beijing Olympics: Gold Medal Challenges, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 
433, 436 (Spring 2008); Stephen McKelvey, As Games Approach, Time to Reconsider 
Ambush Marketing, SPORTS BUS. J., Jan. 18, 2010, at 23. 
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activities carried on during high-profile international events that they 
categorize as ambush marketing.13  Although Congress granted the 
United States Olympic Committee (“USOC”) unprecedented 
statutory protection over its registered trademarks through the 
Amateur Sports Act in 1978,14 many analysts have still described the 
United States as a comparatively “tolerant legal regime”15 that is 
“currently underequipped to counter ambush marketing 
effectively.”16  However, despite such assessments, the concept of 
ambush marketing does not expose any shortcoming in the existing 
American legal framework of trademark and unfair competition law, 
and any additional legislation specifically targeted toward ambush 
marketing is unwarranted. 
Words matter.  Legal commentators, event organizers, and 
corporate sponsors have used the term “ambush marketing” far too 
loosely.  As stated above, the literature typically defines ambush 
marketing as “a company’s attempt to capitalize on the goodwill, 
reputation, and popularity of a particular event by creating an 
association without the authorization or consent of the necessary 
parties.”17  The alleged unauthorized “creation of association” with an 
event is the most problematic aspect of this definition and use of the 
term because, as will be discussed below, the Lanham Act clearly 
prohibits advertising that is “likely to cause confusion, or to cause 
mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or 
association . . . or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of . . . 
goods, services, or commercial activities.”18  The fact that few 
purported “ambush” cases have ever been litigated through to a final 
judgment indicates that what event organizers and corporate sponsors 
typically allege to be “ambushes” which supposedly create consumer 
confusion as to official sponsorships and endorsements in fact do not 
create any likelihood of confusion. 
Despite the glaring contradictions between the accepted 
definition of ambush marketing and the term’s frequent application, 
13. Bischoff, supra note 10; see supra note 1.
14. San Francisco Arts and Athletics, Inc. v. USOC, 483 U.S. 522, 531 (1987) (Unlike
traditional claims under the Lanham Act, under the Amateur Sports Act, “the USOC 
need not prove that a contested use [of its registered marks] is likely to cause confusion, 
and an unauthorized user of the [marks] does not have available the normal statutory 
defenses.”). 
15. Bischoff, supra note 10, at 19.
16. Sheridan, supra note 6, at 31.
17. Schmitz, supra note 8.
18. Lanham (Trademark) Act § 43(a)(1) (2006), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006).
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the parties that stand to benefit from the overly broad use of the term 
nevertheless control the discourse.  These parties are event organizers 
such as national Olympic committees in need of securing sponsorship 
contracts, and companies willing to invest in expensive sponsorship 
agreements.  Although these parties claim that they are concerned 
with the consumer confusion supposedly caused by the marketing 
practices they label as “ambushes,” what they actually seem to be 
concerned with is attaining the power to quell all unauthorized speech 
relating to the high-profile athletic events that they promote.  The 
controversy over ambush marketing has produced the unrealistic 
expectation of event organizers and corporate sponsors that 
sponsorship contracts should be able to restrict the speech of third 
parties.19 
The issues that allegations of ambush marketing raise essentially 
pertain to trademark infringement in the context of promotional 
goods and false association, for which there is an extensive body of 
case law.  This article argues that United States law serves as an 
appropriate international model for prohibiting deceptive marketing 
practices because it properly balances free speech and consumer 
interests with sufficient protection for official corporate sponsors of 
high-profile athletic events, and that corporate sponsors and event 
organizers have no legitimate reason to expect any additional 
protection. 
19. Crow & Hoek point out that:
the normal commercial protections provided by trademark, copyright
and passing off laws need to be supplemented by tighter contractual
provisions between all of the parties involved in the sponsorship of an
event.  If event owners and sponsors develop tighter sponsorship
contracts, they could foster more pragmatic expectations about what
sponsorship can achieve.
Crow, supra note 5, at 11.  Sheridan similarly notes that “one possible solution [to ambush 
marketing] is for companies and their sponsorees to address ambush marketing when they 
first negotiate their sponsorship agreement.”  Sheridan, supra note 6, at 40.  McKelvey 
also suggests that one solution to resolving the controversy “is for the Olympic Movement 
to stop selling official sponsors the promise of an ambush-free environment.”  Stephen 
McKelvey, As Games Approach, Time to Reconsider Ambush Marketing, SPORTS BUS. J., 
Jan. 18, 2010, at 23. 
  
2012] AMBUSH MARKETING 347
III. What Marketing Tactics Are Alleged to Be “Ambushes”?
A. General Allegations of Ambush Marketing
Patrick Sheridan has listed what he and others allege are the four
most prevalent forms of ambush marketing techniques: 
(1) purchasing advertising time around an event in order
to associate a nonsponsoring company as a sponsor of the 
event; (2) negotiating with individual players or teams, who 
are participating in a larger sponsored event or league, to have 
them endorse a nonsponsoring company; (3) using event 
tickets in a promotional contest to tie a nonsponsoring 
company to that event; and (4) [aggressive] marketing [by] a 
nonsponsoring company around the location of an event.20  In 
a slightly more specific context, one company’s event 
management guide warns event organizers that. . . . Planes 
flying low over an event trailing banners advertising 
competitive products, signs erected without permission, and 
unauthorized distribution of flyers and merchandise are all 
examples of ambush marketing.21 
The problem with labeling all of the marketing techniques listed 
above as “ambush marketing” is that all of them can be practiced 
without creating any likelihood that consumers will be confused into 
thinking that there is an association between the event and the party 
employing the technique.  And if no likelihood of confusion as to 
association with the event exists, then event organizers and sponsors 
will not be harmed and thus have no legitimate basis to complain. 
But if a company’s use of any of the marketing techniques listed 
above does create a likelihood that consumers will be confused as to 
the company’s association with an event, the event organizers and 
sponsors have a valid, well-recognized claim in the United States 
under the Lanham Act. 
20. Sheridan, supra note 6, at 32.   John Tripodi & Max Sutherland similarly list these
four techniques as ambush marketing.   Tripodi & Sutherland, supra note 11, at 417. 
21. Graham Medcalf, Bang, You’re Dead!: Ambush Marketing Steps Over the Line of
Guerrilla Marketing’s Legitimacy, N.Z. MKTG. MAG. May, 2005 available at http:// 
business.highbeam.com/6504/article-1G1-132723009/bang-youre-dead-ambush-marketing-
steps-over-line-guerrilla. 
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B. Specific Ambush Allegations
Specific allegations of ambush marketing made during past
Olympic Games highlight some of the problematic gaps in the 
discourse and demonstrate that event organizers and sponsors often 
allege that non-sponsoring companies have engaged in ambush 
marketing merely because those companies advertised in relation to 
the event.  Event organizers such as the IOC and its corporate 
sponsors have demonstrated that they operate under the brazen 
assumption that they are entitled to a niche of the market free of any 
commercial competition whatsoever.  They presume that no activity 
done in relation to their events, or even the mere use of terminology 
evocative of the existence of their events, could ever be fair or 
permissible without their authorization. 
During the summer of 2000, leading up to the Olympic Games in 
Sydney, non-sponsor Nabisco launched an advertisement for its Fig 
Newton cookies that depicted an ancient Olympic athlete throwing a 
discus.22  The ad’s accompanying text read: “The ancient Olympians 
worshipped the fig and used it for energy during training.”23  The 
Nabisco campaign also truthfully stated that the Fig Newton was the 
“Official Energy Food of USA Cycling.”24  Nabisco ran this ad in 
several sports publications.25  PowerBar Inc., an official Olympic 
sponsor, complained to the USOC that Nabisco’s ad campaign 
constituted ambush marketing that infringed upon its official 
sponsorship status, and the USOC subsequently brought suit in 
federal court, alleging that Nabisco had wrongfully tried to create an 
association between its product and the USOC and the Olympic 
Movement.26  Nabisco decided to discontinue its ad campaign and the 
case settled out of court, so there was no judicial evaluation of 
whether Nabisco’s ads violated either the Olympic Amateur Sports 
Act or the Lanham Act.  However, even a cursory consideration of 
Nabisco’s ad—which claimed only that ancient Olympians ate figs—
suggests that, as long as the claim is true, it was most likely 
permissible under the Lanham Act because it is unlikely to have 
caused consumer confusion about Nabisco’s relationship to the 2000 
Olympic Games.  Without the use of the iconic Olympic rings or a 
22. Anne M. Wall, The Game Behind the Games, 91 TRADEMARK REP. 1243, 1261
(2001). 
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. USOC v. Nabisco, Inc., Case No. C-00-3086, 10–11  (N.D. Cal., Aug. 25, 2000).
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direct reference to the Summer Games, it would be a stretch to argue 
that consumers would likely have thought that Nabisco was an official 
sponsor or was somehow associated with the Games just because it 
mentioned that ancient Olympians ate figs. 
The Winter and Summer Olympic Games of 1992 both shared the 
stage with a hotly contested battle between the International Olympic 
Committee and American Express over the latter’s alleged use of 
ambush marketing tactics during the Games.  Visa had paid $20 
million to be one of twelve official sponsors of the Games that year, 
while rival credit card company American Express had not paid to 
become an official sponsor.27  During the Winter Games that took 
place in France, American Express ran television ads that referred 
generally to “winter fun and games” and depicted the French Alps.28  
The ads did not use any registered Olympic symbols or the word 
“Olympic.”29  The IOC nevertheless threatened suit, and Richard 
Pound, the Olympic Committee’s marketing official, claimed that the 
ads sought to confuse consumers into believing American Express 
was an Olympic sponsor,30 and later preposterously asserted that such 
practices were “unethical” and constituted “stealing.”31  Apparently, 
the IOC determined that the argument that American Express’s ads 
created confusion was much weaker than Pound had proclaimed, 
because the case never went to court.32  Furthermore, the American 
Express commercials may have been somewhat justified by the fact 
that Visa’s initial ads during the Games had taken a direct shot at its 
rival, telling viewers that “The Olympics Don’t Take American 
Express.”33 
During the Summer Games of 1992 in Barcelona, American 
Express ran several more television commercials that the IOC and its 
sponsor Visa criticized as harmful ambush marketing.  The ads used 
language that evoked the Summer Olympics, with one concluding 
“And remember, to visit Spain, you don’t need a visa,” and another 
telling viewers that “Obviously, we’re here for more than just the fun 
27. Martha T. Moore, Plastic War:  IOC to Sue AmEx Over Ads, USA TODAY, Feb.
6, 1992, at 1A. 
28. Sheridan, supra note 6, at 32.
29. Id.
30. Stuart Elliot, American Express Replies to Criticism, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1992, at
D18. 
31. Stuart Elliot, Jousting by Mass Marketers is the Newest Olympic Sport, N.Y.
TIMES, July 15, 1992, at D1. 
32. Schmitz, supra note 8, at 205 n.15.
33. Moore, supra note 27.
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and games.”34  At least the first of these ads was highly unlikely to 
have confused consumers because it was an obvious shot at the 
official sponsorship status of Visa through a play on words.  The pun 
essentially prevented both the possibility of confusion between the 
two companies, as well as any confusion over who, between them, was 
the official sponsor of the event.  And although there is little doubt 
that the other ad’s reference to “fun and games” directed viewers’ 
minds to the Olympics, it would be a stretch to suggest that it 
somehow confused consumers as to whether American Express was 
associated with the Olympics. 
The ability to prevent a company from even referencing the 
existence of the Olympics in a way that does not cause confusion 
would be a dramatic departure from trademark law’s primary 
rationale of preventing consumer confusion as to source of origin or 
sponsorship.  The American Express ads during the 1992 Games 
might have disrupted Visa’s desire to be the only credit card company 
that could advertise with content that was in any way related to the 
Olympics, but trademark law is only intended to prohibit commercial 
competition that is unfair, i.e., practices that are likely to confuse 
consumers.35  Trademark law is not intended to provide a 
competition-free commercial environment.  It appears as though it 
would have been difficult to argue that American Express’s 
marketing somehow unfairly or unethically associated itself with the 
1992 Olympics, but if the IOC had actually believed that there was a 
real possibility of consumer confusion as to American Express’s 
association with the 1992 Games and that such confusion had caused 
any harm, it would unquestionably have had a valid claim under the 
Lanham Act.36 
An excellent example of an overly broad ambush claim that 
actually made it to court is USOC v. American Media, Inc.37  In this 
case, the United States Olympic Committee filed suit against 
American Media Inc. (“AMI”) for allegedly “ambushing” the 2000 
Olympic Games in Sydney by publishing a magazine prior to those 
34. Elliot, supra note 31.
35. Two Pesos v. Taco Cabana, 505 U.S. 763, 767–68 (1992) (The Lanham Act was
intended to make “actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks” and “to protect 
persons engaged in . . . commerce against unfair competition” (citing § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 
1127)); Mattel  Inc. v. MCA Records Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 904 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]rademark 
law grants relief only against uses that are likely to confuse.”). 
36. See 505 U.S. at 780 (quoting New West Corp. v. NYM Co. of California, Inc., 595
F.2d 1194, 1201 (9th Cir. 1979).
37. USOC v. Am. Media, Inc., 156 F. Supp. 2d 1200 (D. Colo. 2001).
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Games entitled “OLYMPICS USA” that contained unauthorized 
uses both of the Olympic symbol and the word “Olympic.”38  The 
magazine contained several layouts describing thirty-two different 
Olympic events with photographs of athletes participating in each 
event.39  AMI’s publication also included profiles of featured 
American athletes and an event and broadcast schedule of the 
upcoming Sydney Olympics.40  The magazine contained a disclaimer 
on the table of contents page that denied any affiliation with or 
sanction by the USOC.41 
The USOC brought suit against AMI under the Amateur Sports 
Act of 1978 (“ASA”), which provides the USOC with far greater 
protection over its marks than traditional trademark law under the 
Lanham Act.  Under the ASA “the USOC need not prove that a 
contested use [of its marks] is likely to cause confusion, and an 
unauthorized user of the [marks] does not have available the normal 
statutory defenses.”42  Curiously, the USOC did not also allege a 
violation of the Lanham Act.43  The USOC claimed that AMI had 
violated the ASA by using the USOC’s marks “for the purpose of 
trade and to induce the sale of goods,” and to pass off its magazine as 
if it were authorized by the USOC.44  The USOC drew particular 
attention to the fact that AMI’s magazine used the word “Olympic” 
on its cover, that it contained “Olympic 2000” at least thirty-five 
times, and that it made various other unauthorized uses of Olympic 
marks and terminology such as depictions of medals, the Olympic 
torch and flame, and silhouettes referring to various Olympic events.45  
AMI moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the USOC had failed to 
state a valid claim because its magazine was an editorial publication 
that was non-commercial in nature,46 and therefore the ASA did not 
apply.47 
The District Court for the District of Colorado agreed with AMI 
that its magazine was noncommercial speech and held that the ASA 
38. Id. at 1203.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.  (a violation of the Lanham Act would have required proof of a likelihood of
consumer confusion). 
42. Id.  (citing S.F. Arts and Athletics, Inc. v. USOC, 483 U.S. 522, 531 (1987)).
43. Id. at 1210.
44. Id. at 1203.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1204.
47. Id.
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does not apply to the use of the USOC’s marks in non-commercial 
speech.48  The court went on to state that although the ASA does not 
provide the USOC with protection over its marks used in non-
commercial speech, the Lanham Act could nevertheless provide 
protection if AMI’s noncommercial use of the USOC’s marks 
suggested official endorsement, authorization, or involvement by the 
USOC in publishing its magazine.49  However, since the USOC had 
not alleged or proved a Lanham Act violation, the court could not 
address such a claim.  If the USOC had alleged a Lanham violation, it 
would have had to prove that there was a likelihood that consumers 
would have been confused as to whether AMI was affiliated with or 
endorsed by the USOC.50  The court granted the USOC leave to 
amend its complaint to allege a violation of the Lanham Act,51 but the 
USOC chose not to do so, likely because it determined it could not 
prove that consumers were likely to be confused into thinking that 
AMI’s magazine was authorized or endorsed by the USOC. 
C. What Really Lies at Stake in Ambush Marketing?
Many have argued that the so-called ambush marketing tactics
described above “threaten the USOC’s ability to raise financial 
resources.”52  The threat is often portrayed as having the most dire 
consequences for high-profile athletic event organizers such as the 
USOC.  Patrick Sheridan argues that “the danger of ambush 
marketing is not only consumer confusion, but also the potential loss 
of millions of dollars in future sponsorship fees.”53  On an even more 
alarming note, John Tripodi and Max Sutherland stated that “ambush 
marketing poses a serious threat to the longevity of sponsorship as a 
cost-effective promotional tool,”54 and that it “risks devaluing official, 
corporate sponsorships and could conceivably threaten the financial 
viability of sporting events . . . like the Olympics.”55  Noelle Nish 
asserts:  
Why would PowerBar, Inc. pay millions of dollars for the 
privilege of becoming the official nutrition bar of the 
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1209.
50. Id. at 1210.
51. Id.
52. Nish, supra note 8, at 54.
53. Sheridan, supra note 6, at 32.
54. Tripodi, supra note 11, at 420.
55. Id.
  
2012] AMBUSH MARKETING 353
Olympics if Nabisco, Inc. could step in with the Fig Newton 
and create the impression that it was the official sponsor?  The 
answer probably is, that it wouldn’t.56   
And the USOC itself warned in its complaint against AMI that an 
adverse ruling would threaten its contractual relationships with 
official sponsors, broadcasters, and licensees.57 
In response to “the sky is falling” hysterics over ambush 
marketing, Steve McKelvey makes the important point that “the 
Olympic Movement has historically argued that ambush marketing 
will result in the demise of its official sponsorship program and 
revenue. And yet, despite the continuance of ambush marketing, 
Olympic sponsorship fees escalate each quadrennial.”58  The fact is 
that the IOC collected more than $1.4 billion from all corporate 
sponsorships between 2001 and 2004.59  Under The Olympic Partner 
Program (“TOP”) alone, the IOC’s highest tier of sponsorship, 
“revenue has exploded in recent years, growing from nine TOP 
sponsors contributing $96 million in the 1985–1988 period to eleven 
sponsors contributing $866 million for the 2005–2008 period.”60  
Despite their alleged fear that the prevalence of ambush marketing 
threatens their potential to secure future sponsorships,61 Olympic 
organizers nevertheless estimate that the TOP sponsorship revenue 
for the London Games in 2012 could increase to record levels as high 
as $1.5 billion.62 
It appears that the most serious threat posed by ambush 
marketing is the indiscriminate use of the term itself.  Event 
organizers such as the IOC and its official sponsors often seek to quell 
speech by non-Olympic sponsors that capitalizes on the mere 
occurrence of the Games—which are enjoyed and cherished by the 
world public at-large—even when there is no threat that such speech 
is likely to confuse consumers as to the speaker’s relationship to the 
Olympic Movement.  Because the IOC requires national organizing 
committees of potential host countries to secure protection of the 
Olympic marks and to enact special-event legislation designed to 
56. Nish, supra note 8, at 71.
57. USOC v. Am. Media, Inc., 156 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1210 (D. Colo., 2001).
58. McKelvey, supra note 19.
59. Jenifer Donatuti, Can China Protect the Olympics, or Should the Olympics be
Protected From China?, 15 J. OF INTELL.PROP. L. 203, 207 (2007). 
60. Id.
61. See USOC v Am. Media Inc., 156 F. Supp. 2d at 1210.
62. Id. at 208.
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curtail ambush marketing,63 there is legitimate reason to fear that 
freedom of speech will be at least one casualty in its campaign to kill 
ambush marketing.  For example, Canada passed special-event 
legislation for the 2010 Winter Olympic Games in Vancouver that “so 
infringed upon the commercial speech rights of local businesses and 
constitutional rights of local citizens that the Vancouver-based British 
Columbia Civil Liberties Association and others successfully sued the 
city for less restrictive measures.”64 
IV. U.S. Trademark and Unfair Competition Law
An examination of the applicable provisions of the Lanham Act 
and unfair competition case law in the United States will help 
demonstrate that the typical allegations of ambush marketing are 
usually much ado about nothing.  Again, ambush marketing is 
predominantly defined as “a company’s attempt to capitalize on the 
goodwill, reputation, and popularity of a particular event by creating 
an association without the authorization or consent of the necessary 
parties.”65  As will be discussed below, the Lanham Act and the 
existing case law clearly prohibit advertising that is confusing or 
misleading as to sponsorship or association.  The important point to 
make here is that marketing that capitalizes on the occurrence of an 
athletic event does not ipso facto create a wrongful association with 
that event or indicate an attempt to create a wrongful association with 
that event.  If there is no likelihood that a particular marketing tactic 
has created a wrongful association with an event in the minds of 
consumers, then no problem exists and that tactic cannot fall into the 
category of ambush marketing as defined above.  The real issue 
underlying most allegations of ambush marketing is the desire to 
prohibit all unpaid-for speech by competitors of official sponsors that 
in any way occurs during or references a sponsored athletic event, 
regardless of whether it creates any confusion as to association or 
sponsorship status. 
The concept of ambush marketing, if accurately defined, is 
essentially no different from the concept of false association, for 
which there is an extensive body of case law under the Lanham Act. 
Section 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act states: 
63. Long, supra note 12, at 436.
64. McKelvey, supra note 19.
65. See supra text accompanying note 8.
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Any person who . . . uses in commerce any word, term, name, 
symbol,or device, or any combination thereof, or any false 
designation oforigin, false misleading description of fact, or 
false or misleading representation of fact, which . . . (A) is 
likely to cause confusion, or tocause mistake, or to deceive as 
to the affiliation, connection, orassociation of such person 
with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or 
approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities 
by another person, shall be liable in a civil action. . . .66 
The following are examples of only a few of the many cases that 
analyze false association under the Lanham Act and are applicable to 
the factual circumstances of most allegations of ambush marketing: 
Boston Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan,67 Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc.,68 and 
Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc.69  The crux of a false association 
analysis under these cases lies in the likelihood of consumer 
confusion, and confusion as to a non-sponsor’s association with an 
athletic event is the primary issue in any ambush marketing 
allegation. 
A. Boston Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan
In Boston Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan, defendant Sullivan was an
apparel retailer and defendant Beau Tease, Inc. was an apparel 
distributer.70  The defendants had been imprinting and selling shirts 
with the name “Boston Marathon” and other terms including the 
years of the races since 1978.71  The Boston Athletic Association 
(“BAA”), the organization that annually conducts the Boston 
Marathon, registered its marks “Boston Marathon” and “BAA 
Marathon” in 1983 and subsequently began licensing those marks to 
defray the costs of the race.72  A retailer named Image Impact had 
entered into an exclusive license with the BAA to use its registered 
marks on shirts beginning in 1986.73  Defendants had not secured 
licenses from the BAA to use its marks.  Instead, the defendants 
66. Lanham (Trademark) Act, § 43(a)(1)(A) (2006), (15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A))
(2006). 
67. Boston Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1989).
68. Pirone v. Macmillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1990).
69. Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 658 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981).
70. Boston Athletic Ass’n, 867 F.2d at 24.
71. Id. at 25.
72. Id. at 24–25.
73. Id. at 25.
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began producing and selling shirts in the Boston area imprinted with 
“1986 Marathon” and a picture of runners above the words 
“Hopkinton-Boston.”74  Thus, the defendants had carefully avoided 
copying any of the BAA’s marks on their shirts.  However, the BAA 
nevertheless filed suit in federal court, alleging confusion as to 
sponsorship in violation of the Lanham Act.75 
The District Court held that the BAA’s rights did not extend 
beyond the use of the exact marks it had registered, and that there 
was no confusion between the defendants’ and plaintiffs’ shirts, and 
therefore ruled in favor of the defendants.76  The BAA appealed, and 
the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed.  The First Circuit 
stated that the central issue was a likelihood of confusion under the 
Lanham Act.77  The court noted that the case was not a typical 
trademark infringement case in respect to the BAA’s claim because 
the defendants were using the Boston Marathon, sponsored and 
operated by the BAA, “to promote the sale of goods which are 
adorned so as to capitalize on the race.”78  The court thus determined 
that the “likelihood of confusion” inquiry should focus upon 
“whether the purchasing public is likely to believe that the sponsor of 
the Boston Marathon produces, licenses, or otherwise endorses 
defendants’ shirts.”79  This states precisely the problem that the IOC 
and others allege to be at issue with ambush marketing. 
The First Circuit stated that the BAA had the burden of showing 
that prospective purchasers were in fact likely to be confused or 
misled into thinking that the defendants’ shirts were produced, 
licensed, or sponsored by the plaintiff.80  The court held that even 
though the defendants had not used the plaintiff’s marks, “there can 
be no doubt that the language and design on defendants’ shirts 
intentionally calls attention to an event that has long been sponsored 
and supported by the BAA,” and that the shirts were “clearly 
designed to take advantage of the Boston Marathon and to benefit 
from the good will associated with its promotion by [the BAA].”81  
The court even lowered the BAA’s burden of proving likelihood of 
confusion by stating that the BAA was not required to prove that 
74. Id.  (The Boston Marathon race route begins in Hopkinton and ends in Boston.)
75. Id. at 25–26.
76. Id. at 27.
77. Id. at 28.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 28–29.
80. Id. at 32.
81. Id. at 33.
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members of the public would conclude that the defendants’ shirts 
were officially sponsored by the BAA.82  The court ruled in favor of 
the BAA, holding that purchasers were likely to be confused about 
the source or sponsorship of defendants’ shirts, and that the 
defendants had thus violated the Lanham Act.83 
B. Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc.
In Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc., defendant MacMillan published
“The 1988 MacMillan Baseball Engagement Calendar,” which 
contained photos of several baseball players, among them three 
photos of Babe Ruth.84  The calendar’s title, its back cover, the title 
page, and the copyright page all prominently referred to the 
MacMillan Publishing Company, and the words “Babe Ruth” did not 
appear on the cover.85  Ruth had received compensation for the use of 
his name or his picture in the promotion of various products when he 
was alive, and after his death his daughters Dorothy Ruth Pirone and 
Julia Ruth Stevens registered the words “Babe Ruth” as a 
trademark.86  Pirone and Stevens had subsequently granted an 
amateur baseball league a license to use the “Babe Ruth” mark to 
promote itself and sell various products.87  As a result of MacMillan’s 
use of Ruth’s images in the calendar, Pirone filed suit in federal court 
alleging trademark infringement and unfair competition alongside 
other state law claims.88 
The District Court for the Southern District of New York granted 
MacMillan’s motion for summary judgment on Pirone’s trademark 
and unfair competition claims, and the Second Circuit affirmed.89  It 
held that, while Pirone had established a valid trademark in the words 
“Babe Ruth,” she was incorrect in believing that her rights in those 
marks also included every photo ever taken of Ruth.90  Because 
MacMillan’s calendar used the name and image of Babe Ruth to 
identify a great baseball player rather than as a trademark to identify 
82. Id.
83. Id. at 34.
84. Pirone v. Macmillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1990).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 581, 585.
90. Id. at 582 (2d Cir. 1990).
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the source of the calendar, the court held that the use did not 
constitute trademark infringement.91 
Under Pirone’s unfair competition claim, the court stated that 
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act “is violated by the use of any 
‘symbol’ as a ‘false designation of origin’ or as any ‘false 
representation,’ whether or not a trademark is involved.”92  This rule 
deals specifically with any use of symbols that may be misleading as to 
sponsorship, and is thus directly applicable to any allegation of 
ambush marketing described earlier in this article.  In this case, the 
court held that pictures of Ruth were symbols, but that they did not 
indicate the origin or represent sponsorship of MacMillan’s 
calendar.93 
The Second Circuit went on to state that “the crucial determinant 
in an action for trademark infringement or unfair competition is 
‘whether there is any likelihood that an appreciable number of 
ordinary prudent purchasers are likely to be misled, or indeed simply 
confused, as to the source of the goods in question.’”94  The court 
further clarified that “the public’s belief that the mark’s owner 
sponsored or otherwise approved the use of the trademark satisfies 
the confusion requirement.”95  Because the source of publication was 
clearly indicated with numerous and prominent references to 
MacMillan,96 and because the photos of Ruth were among photos of 
many others featured in MacMillan’s calendar, the court reasoned 
that “an ordinary prudent purchaser would have no difficulty 
discerning that these photos . . . do not in any way indicate 
sponsorship.  No reasonable jury could find likelihood of confusion.”97 
C. Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc.
In Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., Warner Brothers sued
Gay Toys over the latter’s manufacture of a toy car similar to the 1969 
Dodge Charger, known as the “General Lee” and driven by the main 
characters in Warner Brothers’ popular television series “The Dukes 
of Hazzard.”98  Warner Brothers had refused to grant Gay Toys a 
license to use its “Dukes of Hazzard” trademarks, so Gay Toys 
91. Id. at 584.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 585.
98. Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 658 F.2d 76, 78 (2d Cir. 1981).
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labeled its toy as the “Dixie Racer,” reversed the door numerals from 
the “01” that appeared on the “General Lee” to “10” and refrained 
from calling its toy car the “General Lee.”99  However, the toy car was 
identical to the Warner Brothers’ “General Lee” in most other 
respects.100  Warner Brothers contended that the defendant’s toy 
violated Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act because the “Dixie Racer” 
caused consumer confusion in the public’s mind as to the manufacture 
and sponsorship of the toy car.101  Warner Brothers also contended 
that the defendant’s car “[gave] rise to the assumption by the public 
that Gay Toys’ ‘Dixie Racer’ [was] an authorized reproduction of the 
‘General Lee.’”102 
The District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled in 
favor of Gay Toys on Warner Brothers’ motion for a preliminary 
injunction, holding that there could be no proof of confusion because 
Warner Brothers was not in the business of manufacturing toy cars.103  
The issue on appeal before the Second Circuit was whether the 
District Court erred in finding that Warner Brothers failed to show a 
likelihood of confusion as to the source or sponsorship of the 
defendant’s “Dixie Racer.”104  The Second Circuit reversed the lower 
court, finding that there was a sufficient likelihood of confusion as to 
the source and sponsorship of the “Dixie Racer.”105  The court stated 
that “the basic inquiry in an unfair competition action is whether the 
public is likely to be misled into believing that the defendant is 
distributing products manufactured or vouched for by the plaintiff,” 
and that only proof of a likelihood of confusion or deception as 
opposed to proof of actual confusion need be shown to obtain 
equitable relief.106  Under this standard, the court assessed Warner 
Brothers’ evidence of a survey that showed eighty percent of children 
had identified the “Dixie Racer” as the “General Lee” or as “The 
Dukes of Hazzard Car,” and had thus assumed that Warner Brothers 
had sponsored the toy car.107  As such, the court held that Warner 
Brothers had proved a likelihood of confusion as to the sponsorship 
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 77.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 78.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 79.
107. Id.
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of the defendant’s “Dixie Racer” and reversed the District Court’s 
order denying Warner Brothers’ request for an injunction.108 
V. Case Law Summary and Ambush Allegation Analysis
The three cases discussed in the previous section are only a few
examples of an exhaustive body of case law on unfair competition and 
trademark infringement under the Lanham Act.  All three cases 
demonstrate that the United States has a legal framework in place 
designed specifically to deal with any activity that is deceptive or 
likely to cause confusion in the marketplace as to association or 
sponsorship.  To receive injunctive relief against an allegedly 
deceptive or confusing practice, a plaintiff must only prove a 
likelihood of confusion as to association or sponsorship, not actual 
confusion.109 
In Boston Athletic Ass’n the First Circuit held that the public was 
likely to be confused by the defendants’ shirts as to their association 
with the organizer of the Boston Marathon, even though the 
defendants had not used any of the plaintiff’s trademarks.110  
Similarly, in Warner Bros. the Second Circuit held that the 
defendant’s “Dixie Racer” toy car  was likely to confuse the public as 
to its association with the Warner Brothers television series “The 
Dukes of Hazard,” even though the toy did not copy any of Warner 
Brothers’ trademarks.111  However, in Pirone the plaintiff was unable 
to provide any evidence that consumers were likely to have been 
confused as to whether the owners of the “Babe Ruth” mark 
sponsored or endorsed the defendant’s baseball calendar.112 
Ambush marketing strategies allegedly attempt to “capitalize on 
the goodwill, reputation, and popularity of a particular event by 
creating an association without the authorization or consent of the 
necessary parties.”113  If marketing tactics alleged to be “ambushes” 
are in fact likely to cause consumer confusion as to a company’s 
association with an event such as the Olympics, then under the 
Lanham Act case law discussed above, event organizers and official 
event sponsors would undoubtedly have recognizable claims in 
108. Id. at 79–80.
109. Id. at 79; Kellie L. Pendras, Revisiting San Francisco Arts & Athletics v. USOC:
Why It is Time to Narrow Protection of the Word “Olympic,” 24 HAW. L. REV. 729, 731–32 
(2002). 
110. Boston Athletic  Ass’n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 33 (1st Cir. 1989).
111. Warner Bros., Inc., 658 F.2d at 78.
112. Pirone v. Macmillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579, 585 (2d Cir. 1990).
113. See supra text accompanying note 8.
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federal court.  Yet, for all of the past allegations of ambush marketing 
during high profile athletic events such as the Olympics over the last 
three decades, few ambush cases have ever gone to trial,114 which begs 
the question as to why. 
Patrick Sheridan answers that question in a way that 
unintentionally dispels the controversy over ambush marketing and 
demonstrates the glaring contradictions inherent in the all-too-
frequent allegations of the practice.115  Like most who complain about 
the constant threat of ambush marketing, Sheridan argues that the 
practice poses the serious danger of consumer confusion as to 
association with an athletic event.116  However, his proposed solution 
is to do away with the plaintiff’s traditional burden under the Lanham 
Act of having to prove a “likelihood of confusion” with an alleged 
ambush marketer’s tactics because, according to him, that threshold is 
too difficult to meet in most ambush cases.117  Thus, Sheridan believes 
that the definitive problem with so-called ambush marketing tactics is 
that they supposedly confuse consumers, but most complainants have 
been so far from being able to prove that confusion is likely that they 
have not even attempted to take their claims into court.  Drawing the 
obvious conclusion from his proposal to lower our unfair competition 
law standards to the point where plaintiffs would not have to prove 
that the advertising is unfair, Sheridan asserts “If sports organizations 
did not have to meet the current likelihood of confusion burden, they 
would likely litigate more ambush marketing claims using trademark 
law and receive successful results.”118 
VI. Conclusion
If any of the practices that are typically categorized as ambush 
marketing during a high-profile athletic event are likely to cause 
confusion as to the alleged ambusher’s association with the event, 
then the Lanham Act provides adequate protection.  Under the 
Lanham Act, event organizers are even spared the burden of proving 
that a particular marketing practice or advertisement actually 
114. Sheridan, supra note 6, at 29.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 32.
117. Id. at 29–30.  “[P]erhaps the most significant impediment to ambush marketing
litigation, at least under the Lanham Act, is the requirement to show consumer confusion 
in an unfair competition claim.”  Id. at 37.  Jason Schmitz similarly concludes that “the 
‘likelihood of confusion’ analysis often does not apply to the facts of ambush cases.” 
Schmitz, supra note 8, at 207. 
118. Sheridan, supra note 6, at 30.
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confuses consumers as to association with the event, and are required 
only to prove that there is a likelihood that consumers would be 
confused.119  This is a reasonable standard that both protects official 
sponsorship agreements and free speech in the competitive free 
market. 
Because United States trademark law adequately balances free 
speech interests with consumer confusion, and because it protects 
markholders and businesses from actions by competitors designed to 
deceive consumers, it should serve as a model for the international 
community to follow when dealing with ambush marketing.  The 
British government especially should reevaluate its strict anti-ambush 
marketing legislation prior to the 2012 Summer Olympic Games in 
London.  In the United States, corporate sponsors and event 
organizers such as the United States Olympic Committee should 
wield their allegations of ambush marketing more precisely and more 
sincerely if they wish to be taken seriously by the American legal 
community and the marketing departments of non-sponsoring 
companies. 
119. Pendras, supra note 110, at 731–32.
